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Abstract
We start with role-based trust management (RBTM) and address some of the challenges associated with using
RBTM in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). We then enhance RBTM with reputation systems (RSs), and propose a
new hybrid trust management system (HTMS). In HTMS, the privilege level of an entity is determined not only by
its role in the system, but also by its reputation score, which in turn is based on its behavior. If a privileged node
becomes compromised and conducts several malicious or risky transactions, then its privilege level is quickly
reduced to limit its access to resources and minimize the damage it can inflict further. The system uses a global,
network-wide perspective to thwart global attacks. Such fine-grained variations of access control and dynamically
assigning privilege levels would be very difficult to accomplish manually. We evaluated HTMS by comparing an
implementation of it against an ideal response. We show that HTMS performs very close to the ideal if we can
accurately estimate the proportion of malicious nodes in the network. We suggest using sampling to estimate this
proportion. However, even if this estimate is not accurate, the results are still much better than using RBTM by
itself.
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Keywords: MANETs, trust management, access control, machine learning
I. Introduction
A typical organization may have many resources, and
entities which want to access those resources. For exam-
ple, in a military setting, there may be resources, such as
battle plans, communication systems, surveillance equip-
ment, and weapons systems that may need to be
accessed by different personnel at different times. Not
all the personnel are granted full access rights to every
resource, and so there must be a trust management sys-
tem (TMS) in place to perform access control. However,
it is cumbersome to enforce access rights based merely
on an entity’s username. Every resource would need to
have a database of usernames that are allowed to access
it, along with authentication mechanisms to verify the
authenticity of usernames provided by users. Making
changes to a person’s access rights would be a daunting
task as every resource that the person accesses would
need to have its database updated. Furthermore, having
separate databases and authentication mechanisms for
each resource makes an attacker’s task easier by provid-
ing him or her with more potential points of entry.
In response to overcoming some of the challenges in
access control, Li et al. introduced role-based trust man-
agement (RBTM) [1]. In essence, RBTM combines the
merits of some earlier studies by merging the concept of
Roles from RBAC (role based access control) [2] with
trust management [3], so that entities are granted access
to resources based on their “roles.” In Section II, we
give more background information about RBTM and
discuss its merits. However, one of the drawbacks of
RBTM is that if an entity is compromised and behaves
badly, RBTM cannot distinguish it from the other enti-
ties with the same role, and keep granting access to
compromised nodes.
To address this problem, we can use reputation sys-
tems (RSs) that grant access to entities based on their
past behavior [4]. This form of trust management is
based on the “reputation” of a node as judged by other
entities in the system. Reputation is the opinion of one
entity about another [5]. This model is inspired by
PGP’s (pretty good privacy’s) web of trust model [6]. In
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this model a member node can vouch for a client node
that wants access to a resource. The model is based on
prior information about the client node [7-9]. A node
builds its reputation by previous positive experiences
with other nodes. What constitutes a “positive experi-
ence” is left to the discretion of the node that vouches
for it. In essence, RSs try to predict the future behavior
of a node by analyzing its past behavior. Good behavior
results in escalation of access rights, whereas bad beha-
vior results in the reduction of rights. However, since
there is no notion of roles in RSs, it cannot be readily
used for the organizations consisting of designated roles,
such as the military, or corporations.
Clearly, a possible combination of these two
approaches will be more suitable to manage and control
access rights in practical systems. In this article, we spe-
cifically investigate how to combine RBTM and RS in
the context of closed mobile ad hoc networks (MAN-
ETs).a A typical MANET may have several resources,
such as printers, file servers, databases, web servers, etc.
In addition, many nodes may provide different services
as part of a larger service-oriented architecture (SOA)
[10] approach. In SOA, large applications are modular-
ized into smaller services which run on heterogeneous
devices. It especially makes sense to use SOA in MAN-
ETs so that large, computationally expensive applica-
tions can be implemented on resource-constrained
devices in a distributed fashion. However, from a secur-
ity standpoint, we need a mechanism to regulate access
to these resources and services so that we can guard
them against insiders or outsiders who would misuse
these resources or launch attacks against them. Often,
different mechanisms are needed to defend the underly-
ing network against the insiders or outsiders. In this
article, we focus on defending against insiders by com-
bining RBTM and RS. Defending against outsiders has
been extensively investigated in our related study [11]
and references therein.
In the context of MANETs, researchers also consid-
ered monitoring-based TM to deal with attacks against
insiders. In this approach, each node’s wireless traffic
is monitored by its neighbors, and conclusions are
drawn based on its behavior [12,13]. Many monitoring-
based systems have been proposed in the literature
[14-18], and the principle behind their operation is
that traffic from a node is classified as legitimate or
illegitimate by its neighbors. Examples of illegitimate
traffic include known attack signatures, viruses, and
worms, or anomalous behavior. A node that is behav-
ing well and communicating mostly legitimate traffic is
deemed to be trustworthy. Such a node accumulates
“good credit” points through its good behavior and
slowly gains access to increasingly sensitive resources.
This model has a very fast response time. A
misbehaving node can quickly be detected, and its traf-
fic can rapidly be blocked. This is because all the
information gathering and decision making is done
within a node’s one-hop neighborhood. Any detected
malicious traffic cannot pass beyond this one-hop
neighborhood. However, the most serious disadvantage
of using monitoring-based TMSs is that they have
been shown to raise too many false positives because
of noise. According to [19], traditional, simulated noise
models do not mimic the behavior of observed noise
patterns in an actual setting, leading to optimistic
results in simulations. In experiments done on
MANET test beds, it was shown that monitoring-based
systems do not work well as they raise too many false
alarms [20]. Therefore, in our research, we do not con-
sider using monitoring-based systems. Instead we focus
on reputation and role-based systems.
Using reputation or role-based TM in MANETs pre-
sents a new set of challenges. This has to do with fac-
tors such as there is no online central authority, many
nodes are limited in their computational resources,
nodes may go offline at any time necessitating redun-
dancy, and nodes are not guaranteed to be completely
trustworthy [21]. To address some of the challenges
associated with MANETs, we first start with RBTM. We
then enhance RBTM with the RS that we proposed in
our related study [22]. As a result, we create a new
hybrid trust management system (HTMS) that can
effectively defend against insider attacks by taking the
advantages of both RBTM and RSs.
The motivation of HTMS is derived from “real life.”
For example, a soldier with a long history of working
with the army is more reliable than a brand new soldier
even though both have the same role. HTMS takes into
account the role of an entity, as well as its historical
behavior and experiences in order to decide which
access rights to be granted to an entity. This approach
has the advantages of not granting complete access to a
new role, but gradually transferring more rights as the
entity becomes more experienced. The process is auto-
matic and it grants rights in small steps, making the
access control fine grained. On the other hand, if an
entity is deemed to misbehave and abuse its rights, then
its rights are reduced even though it still belongs to the
same role. In addition, the system stores a history of
past transactions and their feedbacks so that administra-
tors/supervisors can review the performance of any
entity, and promote/demote it.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we first discuss some background material about
RBTMs. In Section III, we address some of challenges in
utilizing RBTMs in MANETs. We then describe the
proposed HTMS and discuss its merits in Section IV.
We evaluate HTMS and present our findings in Section
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V. Finally, we conclude this article and give some direc-
tions for future studies in Section VI.
II. RBTM: Background
As mentioned in previous section, RBTM [23] combines
the concept of Roles from RBAC [2] with Trust Man-
agement [3,24,25]. RBTM assigns “roles” to entities/
nodes and allows them to access resources based on
their roles [26]. In essence, roles serve to characterize
entities and represent their arbitrary attributes, such as
student, faculty, or staff [27]. In a commercial organiza-
tion, some personnel might belong to the role “man-
ager,” some might belong to “clerical staff,” “executive,”
and so on. All users belonging to a given role are
granted certain access rights using policy statements
called “credentials.” For example, all executives might
have complete access to a file server, while all clerks
might have “read-only” access. Each credential is issued
by an “issuer” to grant access rights to a “subject.” The
issuer also digitally signs the credential to avoid coun-
terfeiting, possibly using X.509 style certificates [28].
To make the above mentioned concepts more con-
crete, let us consider the following example. Suppose a
university wants to grant all the enrolled students the
right to check out books from its library and the right
to purchase parking permits. A tedious way of doing
this would be that enrollment services (ES) would give
the librarian as well as the police department an
updated list of enrolled students each semester. How-
ever, RBTM would make the job much easier. First, the
librarian (issuer) issues a credential to ES (subject) and
delegates to it the right to decide who gets access to the
library. The police department also issues another cre-
dential to ES, delegating to it the right to decide who




ES in turn, issues a credential to all the enrolled stu-
dents each semester. The credential is set to expire at
the end of the semester. For instance, the student ‘Alice’
would receive the following signed credential.
EnrollmentServices.Student → Alice
If Alice needs to use the library, she only needs to
show this credential to the librarian. The librarian can
reconstruct the following “credential chain:”
Library.Checkout → EnrollmentServices.Student → Alice
and grant access to Alice. The police department can
similarly reconstruct its credential chain and allow Alice
to purchase a parking permit. In this way, every enrolled
student can enjoy the same access rights easily, without
the need for ES to send an updated list of students
every semester to every single department at the
university.
The rights granted to entities are directly related to
the job they need to perform. This follows the real
world example where employees/students have access
rights based on their job title. The main advantage of
RBTM is that it avoids requiring different passwords for
each entity or resource. Instead, any entity validates
itself to other entities simply by presenting to them its
signed credential that assigns to it a given role. The
kinds of access rights granted to a given role are fixed
beforehand. However, roles may be dynamically assigned
to individual entities, and so for instance, an external
auditor might temporarily be assigned a “manager” role
for a fixed period of time. The main disadvantage of
RBTM is that it treats all entities within a role equally.
Common observation tells us that not all managers can
be equally trusted; for example: some are most trust-
worthy then others based on their past experience and
duration of employment with the firm. It would not be
practical to assign such fine-tuned roles as “managers
with 10 years experience,” “managers with 5 years
experience,” etc. because then each role would contain
very few entities, perhaps even just one entity. To over-
come this problem, we propose to use a RS along with
RBTM, as discussed in detail later.
III. Using RBTM in Manets
To be able to use RBTM in MANAETs, we need to (a)
find secure and efficient mechanisms to store credentials
in a distributed manner and (b) collect/determine cre-
dential chains under the following problems in MAN-
ETs [29-31];
(1) Attacks on the authenticity of entities, such as
impersonation and Sybil attacks, which are relatively
easy to be done in MANETs.
(2) Ease of eavesdropping which exposes the identity
of communicating entities. This may be a problem if we
would like to keep the identity of a user confidential,
such as in a military, or financial, or medical setting.
(3) Problem of selfish nodes which refuse to coop-
erate, such as not providing or storing credentials, not
complying with rules regarding access rights, etc. Actu-
ally, this should not be an issue in close MANETs dur-
ing the normal operation. However, compromised
insider nodes may create this problem.
(4) Unauthorized alteration of distributed/stored
resources or exchanged data. It is difficult to police
nodes that are in charge of a distributed resource.
(5) Limited computational resources, especially on the
client side, where devices such as PDAs and cell phones
might request services.
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A. Credential storage
MANET system administrators need to decide who
should store credentials and whether they are stored
redundantly or not. As defined in [23], a credential is a
signed certificate from an issuer, X, that grants certain
rights to the subject, Y, denoted bys
X → Y
Hence X could grant Y access rights to a resource. X
could also delegate authority to Y so that Y could
authorize other nodes. A credential chain can thus be
formed:
X → Y → Z
In this case, X authorizes Y and Y grants access rights
to Z. The chain could be arbitrarily long. It is also possi-
ble to construct a web of credentials where multiple
issuers issue credentials to multiple subjects:
X → Y → Z → U → V
↓ ↑ ↓
S → W T
This creates the problem of who should store the cre-
dentials [32]. Should the issuer of a credential store it,
or the subject, or a third party? A third party could, for
instance, be a credential storage server, but this would
create scalability and availability issues since, if the
server goes down, the system would be incapacitated. It
is therefore desirable to have distributed storage of cre-
dentials. The location of the credential has significant
consequences when it comes to credential distribution
and collection, which is discussed in the next subsection.
Another problem that we need to address is whether
the credentials should be stored redundantly or not. In
the chain X ® Y ® Z, consider what would happen if Y
were to suddenly go offline. Regardless of whether the
issuer or the subject chooses to store a credential, if Y
goes offline, we cannot complete the chain since Y is
both an issuer and a subject. In this case, Z will not be
able to gain access rights even though it is entitled to it.
Let us say, we choose to store a credential with both its
issuer as well as its subject for the sake of redundancy.
Then, the scheme still fails in cases such as W ® X ®
Y ® Z if both X and Y were to go offline simulta-
neously, since the middle credential would become inac-
cessible. There is a tradeoff between redundancy and
storage requirement based on the degree of robustness a
network prefers.
Redundancy
Ideally, a MANET must store credentials redundantly.
Since the entire system is distributed, we cannot store
all the credentials at a centralized server. Therefore,
each issuer (or subject) stores its own credentials.
However, if an issuer such as X goes offline, we would
like Z to be able to contact some other node to obtain
X’s credentials. One possibility is that we designate
another node, W, to store a duplicate of all of X’s cre-
dentials. In case X is unreachable, Z would contact W to
obtain the credentials. Howeer, if a malicious node
wants to target X and remove all its credentials, then it
only needs to attack X and W and disable them.
We propose that instead of storing all the credentials
in one backup node, X would randomly divide all its
credentials into r equal-sized groups and distribute each
group to r different nodes to store. Since each credential
is signed by X, it cannot be tampered with. If X becomes
unreachable, Z can contact each of the r nodes in turn
to obtain the complete set of X’s credentials. Using this
approach, we do not increase the storage or bandwidth
requirements, but we make it harder for an attacker to
disable access to all of X’s credentials (the total number
of nodes accessed by Z is increased, however). To dis-
able access to all of X’s credentials, the attacker must
bring down all r nodes along with X. Further redun-
dancy can be introduced by storing each group of cre-
dentials on more than one node. This would increase
storage requirement though, so a balance needs to be
reached between storage requirement and the preferred
degree of redundancy.
Which group of nodes X chooses to store its creden-
tials on depends on the implementation. One possibility
is that X can simply choose the nodes with the next
higher (or lower) IP addresses compared to its own.
Another possibility is that X would take a hash of its
own ID. It would then mod the hash value with the
number of nodes in the network, n, to decide which
node should store the credentials. X can hash its ID
twice, or thrice to obtain the next nodes that store the
credentials. When Z needs to access X’s credentials and
X is offline, Z can repeat the same procedure to deter-
mine which node to go to ask for X’s credentials. The
advantage of this approach is that it can distribute cre-
dentials in a pseudo-random fashion within the network
and avoid possible “clustering,” where a small group of
nodes end up storing most of the credentials.
B. Credential chain distribution and collection
The problem of searching for credentials is directly cor-
related with where the credentials are stored. In [32],
the authors discuss three approaches for constructing
the chain of credentials going from the subject; the cli-
ent requesting a service, to the issuer; and the server
offering the service. The first approach is a top-down
approach where one would begin constructing the chain
starting from the issuer’s end and spanning out until
one would encounter the subject at the end of the
chain. The second approach is a bottom-up approach in
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which one would start at the subject’s end and span out
backward until the issuer is reached. The third approach
is a meet-in-the-middle approach where one would start
at both the issuer’s and the subject’s ends and meet in
the middle. It is important to realize that a node storing
a given credential could be located anywhere within the
MANET, and so a credential such as X ® Y does not
imply that X and Y are neighbors.
Some practical considerations need to be kept in
mind when designing the system. Consider the case
where Z needs to use a service provided by X. Z must
find and present to X a credential chain authorizing Z
to use its services. We assume that the chain X ® Y
® Z exists. Suppose we choose to store the credential
with the subject. In such a case, it would make sense
to use the bottom-up approach. Since Z has the cre-
dential Y ® Z, it knows it must contact Y to obtain
the next link up in the chain. Z would contact Y and
ask for all the credentials it possesses to see if a chain
back to X can be constructed. Once Z receives the cre-
dential X ® Y, it stops searching. If such a credential
is not found, then it would in turn contact each of the
issuers of Y’s credentials and fan out from there until
it reaches X, or until the maximum allowed search
depth is reached. The maximum search depth should
be so chosen as to allow the most of the chains to be
found while not being so large as to place an excessive
load on the network and on the node performing the
search.
Conversely, if the credential is stored with the issuer,
then we should use the top-down approach. In that
case, Z would begin at X and know that it needs to con-
tact Y next when it sees the credential X ® Y. A meet-
in-the-middle approach would be effective if both the
issuer and the subject store the credential.
IV. Proposed HTMS
The proposed HTMS tries to take the advantages of
both the Role based and Reputation-based TMSs by
enhancing RBTM with RS. In HTMS, each entity is
assigned a role beforehand by an administrative author-
ity. However, all entities belonging to the same role do
not necessarily have the same access rights. Within each
role, a range of access rights is defined from a minimum
privilege level, to a maximum privilege level. For
instance, minimum privilege level access could mean
that a soldier can only receive communications. Soldiers
with higher privilege levels could receive as well as send
communications, whereas soldiers with maximum privi-
lege levels could access battle plans.
Privilege levels are real values between 0 and 1, with
0 being the least privileged, and 1 being the most pri-
vileged. Nodes with 0 privilege level cannot access any
resource on the network, whereas nodes with privilege
level 1 have full access to all the resources on the net-
work. When the administrative authority assigns a role
to a new node, it defines a minimum and a maximum
privilege level that the node can possess. At any point
of time, the exact privilege level of the node is deter-
mined by its reputation score, but it will always fall
within this range. The administrator then issues a digi-
tally signed certificate to the node, with the following
credentials:
〈Node ID, Role, MinPL, MaxPL, Expiration Time〉
where Node ID is the ID of the node, and Role is the
role title, such as private, major, colonel, or general, and
is only meant for human consumption.
MinPL and MaxPL are the numbers between 0 and 1,
and where MinPL ≤ MaxPL, respectively, denote the
minimum and maximum privilege levels of a given role.
Expiration time is the time when the certificate becomes
invalid and must be renewed.
This certificate is signed by the administrator and
given to the user, say John, who is assigned a role of
major. All the majors have the same maximum and
minimum privilege levels. John can carry this certificate
on a smart card, or this certificate can be linked to
John’s login credentials so that it becomes active when-
ever John logs in to a machine. That machine then
becomes a node with the Node ID given by John’s certi-
ficate. In this way, the certificate is not linked with any
particular machine, rather with the user himself who is
free to switch machines in the network.
Whenever the node needs to access any service on the
network, it will present this certificate to the server. The
server will check what is the minimum privilege level
required to access that particular service. This required
privilege level is decided beforehand by the server
administrator. Then, the server will proceed as follows:
(1) Verify the signature to ensure that the certificate
originated from the administrative authority.
(2) If the required privilege level for the service is
greater than the maximum privilege level on the certifi-
cate, then deny service.
(3) If the required privilege level for the service is less
than the minimum privilege level on the certificate, then
grant service.
(4) If the required privilege level for the service is in
between the minimum and the maximum privilege on
the certificate, then obtain the reputation score of the
node and compute its privilege level at that point of
time (explained below).
(5) If node’s privilege level is greater than or equal to
the required privilege level, then grant service; other-
wise, deny service.
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A. Determining the Exact Privilege Level
As mentioned before, the exact privilege level of a node
at a given point of time is determined by its reputation
score, which is computed based on the feedbacks
obtained from other nodes through the underlying RS.
In general, we can summarize existing RSs [33-38]
within the general framework shown in Figure 1.
According to this framework, each node that interacts
with another node stores some feedback about the inter-
action. The interaction is either classified as legitimate
or suspicious (or some value in between). If, for
instance, the interaction consisted of downloading a file,
the client could determine if the downloaded file was
indeed the one requested, or it was a Trojan or a worm.
Based on the feedback of various nodes, a new node can
decide whether to transact with a given node or not,
even though they may never have interacted before. The
underlying principle is that a node that has behaved
well in the past is likely to behave well in the future,
and so it gets high reputation score. On the other hand,
a node that has misbehaved in the past is likely to mis-
behave in the future, and so it gets low reputation score.
For example, eBay utilizes this form of RS where pre-
vious buyers leave feedback about the seller so that pro-
spective buyers can decide whether to buy from the
seller or not [39].
HTMS can actually use any RS [4,34,35,37]. However,
we chose to use our previously proposed Machine
Learning-based RS [22,40] for our experiments. The rea-
sons for this choice are mentioned in Section V. In any
case, whichever RS the network administrator decides to
use, the only requirement is that the RS outputs a repu-
tation score between 0 and 1, with 0 being the least
reputable. The RS needs to guard against the possibility
of malicious nodes giving incorrect feedback to malign
another node. In case the node has no history, the RS
outputs a preset default score, for example, 0.5.
Suppose a client wants to interact with a server. In
HTMS, the server needs to first obtain the reputation
score of the client. Accordingly, the server broadcasts a
feedback request throughout the network. Any node
that has transacted with the client before responds to
the request and sends back encrypted and digitally
signed feedbacks to the server. The server decrypts and
verifies the signature of the feedback, and then com-
putes a reputation score using any RS implementation.
Once the reputation score is obtained, the final privilege
level is computed using the following equation:
PL = (MaxPL−MinPL) ∗ RScore +MinPL (1)
where PL is the current privilege level, MaxPL and
MinPL are the maximum and minimum privilege levels
respectively in the given role certificate. RScore is the
reputation score, as outputed by the RS. Equation 1 sim-
ply normalizes the privilege level between the minimum
and maximum levels. An RScore of 0 yields the mini-
mum privilege level, whereas an RScore of 1 yields the
maximum privilege level. A server will grant access to
the requested service if PL ≥ MinPL for that service.
B. Merits of HTMS
Thwarting Global Attacks
The rationale behind HTMS is to find a solution to the
problem where a privileged node is compromised by an
attacker and then used to damage the network in some
way. This could be by trying to attack other nodes, or
by conducting malicious transactions with servers. One
transaction on its own may not seem malicious, but
when a combination of potentially harmful transactions
occur globally throughout the network, the results could
be disastrous. For instance, one update by a colonel to
battle plans may not seem harmful, but a series of small
updates over time may change the battle plans entirely.
HTMS aims to thwart such attacks by collecting data
from multiple parties that have transacted with the node
before, and then deciding whether to grant access to
this node using a global picture.
For this to be effective, each server assigns a feedback
score between -1 and 1 to every transaction that takes
place on the server. Potentially harmful transactions,
such as updates to battle plans, or changes to passwords
are assigned a negative feedback score, whereas harmless
transactions, such as reading or printing non-classified
files, are assigned positive feedback scores. Similarly,
transactions deemed to be malicious, such as uploading
viruses or worms, or trying to initiate a buffer overflow
attack, will be given negative feedback scores. All of
these feedbacks are then used by the RS to compute the
Figure 1 General framework of a RS that decides whether to transact with a given node or not.
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overall reliability of the node, which in turn is used to
determine access rights. A node that has conducted
many potentially harmful transactions in the recent past
will have a low reputation score, and service will be
denied to it, even if it possesses a privileged role, thus
thwarting any potential global attacks. At the very least,
the attacker will have to slow down the attack, giving
more time to the authorities to detect and defeat the
attacker.
There might be some roles that routinely need to
make mission-critical updates and these updates might
give the role a bad reputation. Therefore, such crucial
roles will have high minimum privilege levels so that
they can do their job even with low reputation scores.
However, extra precautions have to be taken to protect
such roles from compromise.
Modeling Real World Scenario
The scheme models the real-world where an employee
is given access rights based on his or her job title. At
first, he or she is given a certain level of privilege. If he
or she is observed to abuse his or her rights, some of
his or her privileges are revoked. On the other hand, if
he or she behaves well and gains the trust of he or her
colleagues, he or she is rewarded with progressively
higher access rights. This increase in rights may also be
based on the fact that he or she will become more
experienced over time and less likely to abuse the sys-
tem inadvertently. Eventually, he or she may gain more
and more trust and be promoted to a better position.
Our scheme follows this model, and it is therefore
intuitive.
Defense Against False Evidence
By maintaining a RS, we can deter a malicious node, M,
from continuously presenting false evidence against X.
Because the RS is based on evidence presented by sev-
eral nodes, no single node can falsely incriminate X to
significantly reduce its access rights. In any case, X’s
rights can never go below the minimum level within its
role. Furthermore, if M repeatedly gives a low score to
other nodes, it will hurt M’s own reputation and dimin-
ish its own access rights.
Decentralized System
No single node holds all the evidence regarding any
node. Therefore, if any one or a few nodes go offline
then the system can still function well. The RS may be
marginally affected since the contribution from the off-
line nodes will be missing, but it will usually not be cri-
tical if only a few nodes are offline.
Updating Roles
Periodically, the administrators responsible for role
assignment can look at a node’s past behavior and
reconsider the role assigned to it. They could demote or
promote a node to a different role (or job title) based
on the behavior. Since each role credential carries an
expiry date and time, temporary roles could also be
assigned to guest entities for a predetermined amount of
time.
Historical Record Keeping
This will encourage each node to always behave well so
that it may retain or upgrade its access rights. This is
similar to the credit score system maintained by credit
agencies for individuals in the United States.
V. Evaluating HTMS
We use simulations to evaluate the efficacy of HTMS.
Specifically, we focus on a node, X, within a large net-
work of 1,000 nodes. Node X transacts with randomly
selected nodes on the network. The behavior of node X
varies randomly with time. Time is measured in units of
days from 1 to 365 (i.e., one year). The behavior of a
node on any given day is quantified as
Proportion of Good Transactions =
Number of Legitimate Transactions
Total Number of Transactions
.
To simulate the behavior of an actual node that may
have been compromised, we use a randomly generated
behavior (i.e., Proportion of Good Transactions) curve
that fluctuates slowly over time, as illustrated by a
dashed blue line in Figure 2.
Privilege levels are defined on a scale from 0 to 1,
where 0 represents no access rights to any resource on
the network, and 1 represents complete access to all
available resources. In our simulation, the system
administrator has assigned to node X a certain role,
with a maximum privilege level of 0.8 and a minimum
privilege level of 0.2. Other roles may have other corre-
sponding minimum and maximum levels assigned by
the administrator. The actual privilege level of node X
depends on its behavior at any given point in time. In
the ideal case, we would like the privilege level at any
given time to be proportional to the behavior of the
node at that time. If the behavior (i.e., Proportion of
Good Transactions) is 1, then the privilege level should
be maximum (i.e., 0.8). If the behavior is 0, then the pri-
vilege level should be minimum (i.e., 0.2). If the beha-
vior is between 0 and 1, the privilege level will be
computed using Equation 1. Hence, it will be any value
between 0.2 and 0.8. Under no circumstances will the
privilege level be higher than 0.8, or lower than 0.2. The
ideal curve for the simulated behavior is illustrated by a
solid red line in Figure 2.
The efficacy of a Trust Management (TM) mechanism
will be measured by how well it can mimic the ideal
curve as closely as possible. The ideal curve, therefore,
represents the yardstick against which a TM implemen-
tation can be compared. Of course, in this simulation
setup, we know the exact behavior of a node; but in an
actual setting, we would need to estimate it using the
Akbani and Korkmaz EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2011, 2011:90
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2011/1/90
Page 7 of 14
feedbacks obtained from other nodes through the
underlying RS.
We used an implementation of the Support Vector
Machine (SVM)-based RS that we proposed in a pre-
vious study [22] because of the following reasons:
(1) This RS has been shown to perform well with
varying patterns of malicious behavior and varying pro-
portions of malicious nodes.
(2) It protects against fake feedbacks about transac-
tions that never really occurred.
(3) Since it is based on Machine Learning and SVM, it
is easy to construct the RS model and automatically
determine the model’s parameters if there training data
available [41].
We generated the training data using simulations on a
different behavior curve. The proportion of malicious
nodes in the network was varied in different simulations
to obtain different training sets. A malicious node is
defined as a node that lies and gives incorrect feedback
about a node in an attempt to either decrease its reputa-
tion, or to increase it if the node is another colluding
malicious node. The training sets were then used to
train the SVM.
The test sets were generated using the behavior curve
illustrated in Figure 2. Feedbacks were taken from the
nodes in the network that had transacted with node X.
The proportion of malicious nodes in the network was
varied between 0% and 70%, so that the feedbacks were
not always reliable. Each training and test instance
consists of feedbacks obtained over the previous 7 days
(i.e., one week). Accordingly, the privilege levels are
automatically updated every 7 days so that a given
privilege level is valid for one week.
In the first set of experiments, we used a training set
consisting of 0% malicious nodes to train the SVM.
Then, we tested this model against five different test sets
consisting of 0-70% malicious nodes. The output of the
model for each test set over time is plotted in Figure 3.
The figure shows that the model closely mimics the ideal
curve when the proportion of malicious nodes in the test
set is also 0%, same as in the training set. For other pro-
portions, the output deviates from the ideal curve,
becoming almost a horizontal line at 50%. It becomes a
mirror image of the ideal curve above 50%, increasing
when the ideal curve decreases and vice versa. This is
because after 50%, a majority of the nodes lie about the
feedback, giving good feedback when the node is bad,
and bad feedback when the node is good. This malicious
majority overwhelms the feedback from the minority
legitimate nodes, leading the SVM to reverse its output.
At 50%, neither malicious nor legitimate nodes can over-
whelm each other, and so the SVM produces a constant
output of approximately 0.5.
We quantified the deviations of the test curves from
the ideal curve by measuring the average overestimation
of the curve, when the system grants more privilege
than it should have, and underestimations of the curve,
when the system grants fewer privileges than it should
Figure 2 Randomly generated behavior of a node versus the corresponding ideal response curve, along with maximum and minimum
privilege levels.
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have. The daily averages of the over-and under-estima-
tions are plotted in Figure 4. The sum of over-and
under-estimation gives the overall average discrepancy
from the ideal curve. As expected, the smallest discre-
pancy occurs when the percentage of malicious nodes in
the test set is 0%, the same as in the training set. At 0%,
the discrepancy is only about 0.008, which means that
on average the system is off from the ideal privilege
level by ±0.004. However, the discrepancy can be as
high as 0.27, when 70% of the nodes are malicious.
Figure 3 Effect of varying proportions of malicious nodes in test sets. Training set has 0% malicious nodes.
Figure 4 Average daily discrepancy from the ideal curve versus percentage of malicious nodes in the network (smaller is better).
Training set has 0% malicious nodes.
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We hypothesized that the discrepancy for a given test
set would be minimized when the percentage of mali-
cious nodes in the test set would be the same as in the
training set. To test this hypothesis, we conducted
further experiments, this time using different percen-
tages of malicious nodes in the training sets. For the
second set of experiments, we used 30% malicious
nodes in the training set and repeated the experiments
with the same test sets as before. The results are shown
in Figures 5 and 6. Then, we repeated the experiments
with 70% malicious nodes in the training set. The results
are shown in Figures 7 and 8. The results support our
hypothesis that the discrepancy is minimized when the
percentage of malicious nodes in the test set is the same
as in the training set.
A. Estimating Percentage of Malicious Nodes
Based on our results, we can conclude that to minimize
the discrepancy, we need to train the SVM model using
a training set that has approximately the same percen-
tage of malicious nodes as the test set. Unfortunately, in
a real-world setting, we do not know what the percen-
tage of malicious nodes actually is, and it may vary with
time. To overcome this problem, we propose generating
several SVM models using different percentages of mali-
cious nodes, for example, 0%, 10%, 20%, and so on.
Then, we need to estimate the percentage of malicious
nodes in the network, so that we can apply the appro-
priate model.
Estimation of the percentage of malicious nodes can
be done by sampling. To begin with, a node uses a
default SVM model, for instance, the one with 10%
malicious nodes. Using this model, the node classifies
other nodes that try to transact with it as legitimate or
malicious and stores this sample. If the node ends up
transacting with other nodes, then the outcomes of
those transactions are also used for estimating the pro-
portion of malicious nodes. When a sample of a cer-
tain size has been gathered in this way, the proportion
of legitimate versus malicious nodes is estimated, and
the SVM model corresponding to that estimate is used
for future classifications. In this way, the proportion
estimation is done dynamically, and may vary with
time. We actually show next that a sample size of
about 20-25 is sufficient for estimating the percentage
of malicious nodes in a large network and selecting an
SVM model with reasonable accuracy. However, even
if we cannot accurately estimate this percentage,
HTMS still performs better than just using RBTM
which simply makes nodes have maximum privilege all
the time.
To show the effectiveness of sampling method, we
conducted some experiments to determine what a good
sample size would be to estimate the percentage of mal-
icious nodes. We ran simulations with various propor-
tions of malicious nodes in the network. Then we
randomly sampled the nodes and determined which of
them were malicious. Based on the proportion of
Figure 5 Effect of varying proportions of malicious nodes in test sets. Training set has 30% malicious nodes.
Akbani and Korkmaz EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2011, 2011:90
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2011/1/90
Page 10 of 14
malicious nodes in our random sample, we estimated
the actual proportion in the entire network. Let Aprop
denote the actual proportion of malicious nodes, and
Eprop denote the estimated proportion of malicious
nodes. Then, we can compute the absolute estimation
error as Error = Eprop - Aprop.
Figure 9 shows the Error against various sample sizes.
The results show that the error is erratic and unstable
until a sample size of about 20. After 20 samples, a fairly
good estimate of the actual proportion can be obtained.
We therefore recommend that nodes should obtain a
sample of at least 20 before adjusting their thresholds.
Figure 6 Average daily discrepancy from the ideal curve versus percentage of malicious nodes in the network. Training set has 30%
malicious nodes.
Figure 7 Effect of varying proportions of malicious nodes in test sets. Training set has 70% malicious nodes.
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VI. Conclusions and Future Work
In this article, we proposed a new HTMS that combines
RBTM with RSs. At any given point of time, the privi-
lege level of a node is determined not only by its role in
the system, but also by its reputation score. The advan-
tages of HTMS are that it allows automatic, fine-grained
access control to network resources based on a node’s
behavior. If a privileged node becomes compromised
and conducts several malicious or risky transactions,
then its privilege level is quickly reduced to limit its
access to resources and minimize the damage it can
further inflict. This is accomplished by utilizing a global
picture that is constructed by obtaining feedbacks from
many sources on the network in order to determine
Figure 8 Average daily discrepancy from the ideal curve versus percentage of malicious nodes in the network. Training set has 70%
malicious nodes.
Figure 9 Absolute estimation error versus number of samples taken for different proportions of malicious nodes in the network.
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access rights. If a node behaves well and conducts legiti-
mate transactions, then more privileges are granted to
it, providing an incentive to users to behave well. Such
fine-grained access control and dynamically assigning
privilege levels would be very difficult to accomplish
manually.
Other advantages of the system are that it models real-
world scenarios where experience and good behavior are
rewarded with higher privileges, whereas novices and
unreliable entities are only given limited rights. Further-
more, the system is decentralized and prevents a single
node from damaging the reputation of others. It also
keeps historical records of every node’s behavior, making
it easy for system administrators to monitor their beha-
vior and promote or demote a node’s role.
We evaluated the performance of a particular imple-
mentation of HTMS on a simulated network, using our
previously proposed SVM-based RS [22]. We deter-
mined the ideal response that the system should have
and compared the actual response with the ideal as a
benchmark. The results show that the actual response is
very close to the ideal response if the percentages of
malicious nodes in the training and test sets are the
same. Since we do not know this percentage in an actual
network, we recommended using sampling to estimate
this percentage and then using this estimate to deter-
mine which SVM model to use for generating maximum
accuracy. Even if the estimate is not accurate, HTMS
still performs better than just RBTM by itself, since
RBTM would simply allow maximum privileges to the
node all the time.
In future, we aim to devise better estimation mechan-
isms that can more accurately determine the percentage
of malicious nodes in the network. We also aim to con-
struct better SVM models that are more resilient to
changes in the percentage of malicious nodes, and give
us better results. This may be accomplished by trying
different SVM kernels and varying its parameters.
Endnotes
aMANETs can be classified as open or closed. In an
open MANET, anyone is free to enter or leave the net-
work (e.g., in airports and university campuses), whereas
in a closed MANET, only designated nodes are allowed
to access the network (e.g., in a military setting). In gen-
eral, it is more difficult to provide security in an open
MANETs since there is no restriction on who may
access the network. Fortunately, the security require-
ments of such networks are also not very demanding
since users expect public networks to be insecure. By
contrast, closed networks may have very strict security
requirements, such as in the military or in the police
department.
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